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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate both the segment disclosure practice of firms listed on the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) and the factors that influence their level of segment disclosures. 
Consistent with prior disclosure research, the level of segment disclosure is examined using a 
disclosure index based on the mandatory requirements of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 
14 (Segment Reporting). The results show that the average level of segment disclosure in a sample 
of 123 KSE-listed firms in 2008 was 56%%, ranging from 18% to 94%. Users of KSE-listed firms’ 
financial statements might reasonably expect greater segment disclosures from larger, older, 
highly leveraged, and profitable KSE-listed firms, as well as from firms audited by a Big-4 audit 
firm. The findings provide feedback to the regulatory and enforcement bodies in Kuwait on 
current segment disclosure practice among KSE-listed companies and the factors that influence 
the level of segment disclosures. The noticeable variation in the level of segment disclosure among 
listed firms suggests a need for further monitoring of the enforcement of required segment 
disclosure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 consolidated financial statement provides information about a firms overall profitability, risk, and 
growth potential.  However, with the growing diversification and complexity of business enterprises, 
investors and investment analysts have sought more value-relevant information in order to make 
informed investment decisions.  Investors and analysts need to understand how the various components of a 
diversified firm behave economically.  It is difficult, if not impossible, for investors and analysts to predict the 
overall amounts, timing, and risks of a complete firm‘s future cash flows without desegregation, therefore segmental 
information is essential to investment analysis (AIMR, 1993).  Berger and Hann (2002) argue that disaggregated 
information is extremely useful and important to financial statement users.  A survey conducted by Epstein and 
Palepu (1999) of 140 star sell-side analysts reveals that most analysts consider segment-performance information to 
be the most useful for their investment decisions.  
 
Recognizing the critical role of segmental information in helping investors make economic decisions, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) established the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14 
(Segment Reporting).  The objective of IAS 14 is to establish principles for reporting financial information 
according to a firm‘s line of business and geographical area to help users of financial statements better understand a 
firm‘s past performance; this allows a better assessment of a firm‘s risks and returns; and provides users with 
sufficient information to make informed judgments about a firm as whole (IASB, 2008). 
 
Prior research has highlighted a number of problem areas on segment reporting, however, particularly in 
managerial discretion in segment-information disclosure (Street et al., 2000). Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) argue 
that firms respond to segment-reporting disclosure but do not wholly embrace it, which results in substantial 
noncompliance. Birt et al. (2007) argue that the corporate failures involving the loss of hundreds of millions of 
dollars in Australia, the United States, and elsewhere that captured the world‘s attention in the early twenty-first 
century highlighted the vital role of disclosure and compliance. However, users of financial statements have long 
A 
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voiced concern about compliance with segment-reporting disclosures. While the literature investigates segment-
reporting practice in developed markets, little attention has been given to emerging markets where the quality of 
accounting standards and their enforcement are questionable. Motivated by the lack of research on segment-
reporting disclosures in Kuwait, the purpose of this study is to evaluate both the segment disclosure practice of firms 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) and the factors that influence their level of segment disclosures. 
 
Following a review of the literature on disclosure, seven research hypotheses are developed and tested to 
address the influence of firm-specific attributes on the level of segment disclosures. It is hypothesized that the level 
of segment disclosure increases with firm size (H1), auditor type (H2), age (H3), ownership diffusion (H4), 
profitability (H5), and leverage (H6). It is predicted that the level of segment disclosure decreases as the firm grows 
(H6). Consistent with prior disclosure research, the level of segment disclosure is examined using a disclosure index 
based on the mandatory requirements of IAS 14. Descriptive statistics indicate that the average level of segment 
disclosure in a sample of 123 KSE-listed companies in 2008 was 56%, ranging from 18% to 94%. A notable 
variation in the companies‘ levels of segment disclosure is observed in the study sample. This variation encourages 
an examination of the firm characteristics that affect the level of segment disclosure. A multiple regression model is 
used to determine which firm‘s characteristics are associated with segment disclosures. The findings indicate that 
firm size, auditor type, age, profitability, and leverage are significant factors in explaining the level of segment 
disclosure among KSE-listed firms. The results also show that ownership diffusion and growth are not significant 
factors in explaining the level of segment disclosure. 
 
The findings of this study have implications for KSE regulators and the users of KSE-listed companies‘ 
financial statements. This study is the first to empirically investigate the determinants of segment disclosure practice 
among KSE-listed companies. The findings provide feedback to the regulatory bodies in Kuwait on current segment 
disclosure practice among KSE-listed companies and the factors that influence the level of segment disclosures. The 
noticeable variation in the level of segment disclosure among listed companies suggests a need for further 
monitoring of the enforcement of required segment disclosure. Users of KSE-listed companies‘ financial statements 
might reasonably expect greater segment disclosures from larger, older, highly leveraged, and profitable KSE-listed 
firms, as well as from firms audited by a Big-4 audit firm. 
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section discusses the financial reporting 
regulations in Kuwait. In Section 3, we review the literature and develop hypotheses on the corporate determinants 
of segment disclosures. Section 4 contains data and model details, the variables and the sample. In Section 5, we 
present the results of the study. Finally, in Section 6 we provide concluding remarks. 
 
2. FINANCIAL REPORTING REGULATIONS IN KUWAIT 
 
The growth of corporate activity and the rapid changes in the economic and commercial activities in 
Kuwait allowed the government to introduce regulations to handle the potential issues they spawned (Shuaib, 1978). 
Additionally, consistent with their western Anglo-American counterparts, separation of management and ownership 
is an explanation for increased demands for accounting information (Shuaib, 1978).  Indeed, management of 
Kuwaiti companies likewise needed accounting information for making decisions in formulating their policies and 
in directing their operations. Also, it could be said that the Kuwaiti investors, creditors and Kuwait government 
agencies are interested in the financial information related to the financial positions and financial performances of 
the corporations in the country. Against that background the Kuwaiti government reacted to the demand for 
accounting information by issuing several laws and regulations. 
 
Similar to most developing countries, the regulations of accounting in Kuwait are through a conventional 
framework of Commercial Companies Law. This law, considered the primary law, contains statutory accounting 
requirements about the Kuwaiti companies' affairs. 
 
This Law provides only the basic requirements for disclosure and reporting applicable to all companies 
incorporated in Kuwait. The Commercial Companies Law No. 15/1960 requires that companies prepare an annual 
report, including a profit and loss account and balance sheet. Companies are required to provide shareholders with a 
copy of the balance sheet of the expired financial year, profit and loss account and the reports of both the directors 
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and the auditor. Directors are required, within two months of the date of the Annual General Meeting to approve the 
accounts, publish in the official Gazette the balance sheet of the expired year and a list stating the names of the 
directors and the auditors. However, there are no further requirements concerning the form and content of the 
financial statements. It could be said that Law No. 15/1960 failed to indicate the actual level of information that a 
company should disclose. No particular formats were prescribed and even the necessary contents of the accounting 
reports were not specified. 
 
Another law requires information related to financial reporting in Kuwait is Kuwait Commercial Law No. 
68/1980 replaced No.2/1961. This law imposing limited and vague information requirements related to accounting 
aspects. Every company is required to maintain proper accounting records in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, not themselves defined by law. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude local corporate 
disclosure rules and regulations in Kuwait are relatively unsophisticated, comprise minimal disclosure requirements, 
though it might be considered that what they specified not inconsistent with the detail now set out in the IFRSs. Due 
to that, the Kuwaiti government decided to move toward full adoption of IAS/IFRS. 
 
According to Belkaoui, (1994), the possible reasons for countries to move towards ‗full adoption‘ of the 
IFRSs may be to reduce the setup and production costs, joining the international harmonisation drive, facilitating the 
growth of foreign investment, enable their accounting profession to emulate well-established professional standards 
of behaviour and conduct, and to legitimise its status as a full-fledged member of the international community. All 
arguably are consistent with the current state of Kuwait‘s development and would have had unquestionable appeal to 
its government. In 1990, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued Ministerial Resolution No. 18 of 1990. 
According to article 1 of the resolution, all companies in Kuwait, whatever their legal status, to prepare their 
financial statements in accordance with the IFRSs. This resolution placed Kuwait alongside a number of developed 
and developing countries, which have adopted the IFRSs. After adoption of the IFRSs, the level of the financial 
information disclose to users improved significantly.  
 
Since all KSE-listed companies are legally required to comply with all IASs/IFRS, the focus of this study is 
to investigate the level of compliance with all the mandatory disclosures required by IAS 14. The objective of IAS 
14 is to establish principles for reporting financial information by line of business and by geographical area. It 
applies to enterprises whose equity or debt securities are publicly traded and to enterprises in the process of issuing 
securities to the public. In addition, any enterprise voluntarily providing segment information should comply with 
the requirements of the Standard. If an enterprise that is not publicly traded chooses to report segment information 
and claims that its financial statements conform to IAS, then it must follow IAS 14 in full. Segment information 
need not be presented in the separate financial statements of a (a) parent, (b) subsidiary, (c) equity method associate, 
or (d) equity method joint venture that are presented in the same report as the consolidated statements (IASB, 2008).  
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 The Theoretical Framework 
 
The influential works of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) delineate possible incentives for companies 
to provide full disclosure to investors. The authors argue that, in the absence of disclosure, investors must obtain and 
analyze data from other sources, and they incur costs while doing so. Due to a lack of information, investors lower 
the price they are willing to pay for a firm‘s stock. Companies are then motivated to disclose all relevant information 
to mitigate undervaluation. Thus, firms find it more beneficial to disclose additional information to investors. This 
argument is based on the notion that information asymmetry between companies and investors is created when firms 
do not fully disclose information (Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). According to economic theory, information 
asymmetry can increase a firm‘s capital cost because imperfect information can lead to ―adverse selection‖ between 
buyers and sellers of a firm‘s securities. This adverse selection tends to reduce the liquidity of a firm‘s securities 
(Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).  
 
In contrast, increased disclosure improves investors‘ ability to compare firms and permits them to 
recognize and choose more efficient firms. Thus, in the absence of full disclosure, firms must discount share issues 
to provide extra compensation to potential investors who may be hesitant to hold shares in firms that offer limited 
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liquidity. Because of the discount, the firm receives less capital from the issue of equity, ultimately increasing the 
firm‘s capital cost. By increasing their disclosures, firms are likely to mitigate the information asymmetry between 
firms and investors, which should reduce capital costs (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). The reduction in capital 
costs motivates firms to disclose information in their reports to attract investors and maintain low capital costs. 
Although previous studies have documented the benefit associated with greater disclosure, such as reducing equity 
capital and debt costs, Verrecchia (1983) contends the benefits of disclosure are limited by a ―proprietary cost.‖ 
Scott (1994) defines ―proprietary cost‖ as any possible reduction in future cash flows that are attributable to 
disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) argues that the release of more information about a firm, either favorable or 
unfavorable, is useful to competitors, investors, and employees in ways that could threaten the firm‘s prospects and 
competitive position. This could cause reductions in future cash flows. This potential threat associated with 
disclosure may cause firms to limit their disclosure levels when proprietary costs arise. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
document that, when proprietary costs arise, companies have an incentive not to disclose information that could 
weaken their competitive position, even if not disclosing information increases the cost of raising additional equity; 
in other words, there is a cost–benefit trade-off. 
 
3.2 Corporate Determinants Of Segment Disclosures 
 
Several disclosure studies explore the relationship between the level of segment disclosure and various 
corporate characteristics, such as, size, profitability, growth, ownership diffusion, audit quality, leverage, or age. For 
example, Kevin and Zain (2001) examine the relationship between the extent of segment disclosure and four firm 
characteristics: size, financial leverage, proportion of assets in place, and earnings volatility. Their findings indicate 
that only firm size and proportion of assets in place are significant determinants of segment disclosure. Similarly, 
Prencipe (2004), using the proprietary cost theory, shows that firm age, size, growth rate, listing status, ownership 
diffusion, and leverage are significant determinants of the extent of segment disclosure. Furthermore, Abu-Serdaneh 
and Zuriekat (2009) investigate the extent of segment reporting in Jordanian companies and the corporate 
characteristics that affect the level of segment disclosure. Their study shows that companies that have disclosed 
more segmental information are larger, have less ownership diffusion, and a higher assets-in-place percentage.  
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
The literature pertinent to disclosure highlights the effects of firm-specific characteristics on a firm‘s 
disclosure level.  To investigate the determinants of segment disclosures among firms listed on the KSE, this study 
examines seven firm attributes identified in previous studies as significant factors that affect disclosure levels. 
 
Numerous disclosure studies have suggested that larger firms tend to disclose more information in annual 
reports than smaller firms. In their review of disclosure and determinants studies, Chavent et al. (2006) identify 
three reasons for a positive relationship between firm size and disclosure level. First, larger firms are more 
politically visible than smaller firms. As a result, they are exposed to more litigation and government intervention. 
Therefore, larger firms are more willing to disclose information to reduce political costs and mitigate litigation and 
government intervention. Second, the cost of accumulating information is lower for larger firms because of their 
extensive internal reporting systems. Third, smaller firms are more likely to conceal sensitive information because 
full disclosure may jeopardize their competitive positions. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) argue that agency costs are 
higher for larger firms due to the larger number of shareholders. As a result, managers of large firms have an 
incentive to reduce potential agency costs. One way to do that is by disclosing more accounting information. Thus, it 
is hypothesized that 
 
H1: The level of segment disclosure is positively associated with a firm’s size. 
 
The relationship between a firm‘s disclosure level and the size of its external auditing firms is well 
established in the disclosure literature (Palmer, 2008). A positive relationship between disclosure level and the 
quality of external audit has been reported in several studies. The literature has provided several justifications for 
this association. DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger auditing firms have well-established reputations and, therefore, 
have more to lose if they fail to report a discovered breach or make errors or misrepresentations in their clients‘ 
corporate reports. Malone et al. (1993) argue that smaller auditing firms are sensitive to their clients‘ demands 
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because of the economic consequences of losing a client. Wallace and Naser (1995) claim that, due to this sensitivity 
phenomena, larger auditing firms are less likely to depend on one or a few clients. The apparent lack of bonding 
with clients enables larger auditing firms to demand greater disclosure in their clients‘ corporate annual reports 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995).Wallace et al. (1994) argue that firms audited by internationally affiliated auditing firms 
(Big-4) are more likely to provide more detailed information than firms audited by local auditing firms. The 
rationale is that internationally affiliated auditing firms tend to be larger and offer more expertise than local auditing 
firms. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that 
 
H2: The level of segment disclosure is positively associated with being audited by a Big-4 auditing firm. 
 
Firm age, or the number of years since a firm‘s foundation, may affect a firm‘s level of disclosures. In 
comparing older and younger firms, Glaum and Street (2003) argue that younger firms tend to concentrate on 
product and market development rather than accounting when establishing their businesses. In addition, managers of 
younger firms tend to be less experienced in running a listed corporation and complying with regulatory 
requirements. Consequently, Glaum and Street (2003) contend that younger firms‘ accounting systems tend to be 
inadequate, resulting in lower-quality accounting and disclosures. In contrast, older firms tend to have well-
established accounting systems and experienced managers and staff, resulting in higher-quality accounting and 
disclosures. In addition, a possible competitive disadvantage exists for younger firms who disclose more information 
on line of business or by geographical area of business. This disadvantage would arise if competitors were to use 
disclosed information to the detriment of younger firms. In contrast, older firms might be more motivated to disclose 
such information because it would be less likely to harm their competitive positions (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Al-
Sammari, 2005). Due to the large variation in the ages of KSE-listed firms, it is expected that older KSE firms will 
be more likely to comply with IFRS-required disclosures than younger KSE firms. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
 
H3: The level of segment disclosure is positively associated with a firm’s age. 
 
 
Ownership diffusion, measured as the ratio of the number of shares owned by outsiders to the number of 
outstanding shares, has been identified in previous studies as a factor that affects disclosure levels. Agency theory is 
used to explain the behavior of principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) in the separation of ownership and 
firm control. The theory explains problems that arise when shareholders rely on managers to provide services on 
their behalf, which are due to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If parties act in 
self-interest, the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers increases. Due to these interest conflicts, 
agency costs rise. Managers have an incentive to reduce these agency costs, and one way to do so is to disclose more 
accounting information (Morris, 1987). Thus, a positive relationship is expected to be found between ownership 
diffusion and the level of segment disclosure 
 
H4: The level of segment disclosure is positively associated with a firm’s ownership diffusion. 
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) claim that managers are more likely to disclose detailed information when 
profitability is high to signal their ability to maximize shareholders‘ value, increase the security of their positions, 
and justify their compensation. In addition, managers of profitable firms may feel proud of their success and disclose 
more information to the public to promote a positive impression of their performance (Alsaeed, 2006). On the other 
hand, a firm may disclose less information when profitability is low to hide the various reasons for declining 
profitability or even losses. Thus, firms with high profitability would be expected to disclose more information than 
firms with low profitability (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Using agency and signalling theories, Inchausti (1997) 
claims that when managers possess ―good news‖ due to better performance, they disclose more detailed information 
to the market than when they possess ―bad news,‖ to prevent their shares from being undervalued. Consequently, it 
is hypothesized that 
 
H5: The level of segment disclosures is positively associated with a firm’s profitability. 
 
Several previous studies have explored the relationship between disclosure levels and firm leverage. Firms 
with high leverage are generally expected to disclose more information to satisfy creditors (Alsaeed, 2006). In 
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disclosure literature, the agency theory is used to explain the incentive for managers of high-leverage firms to 
provide more disclosure (Morris, 1987).  Alsaeed (2006) argues that firms with proportionally higher levels of debt 
in their capital structure are prone to higher agency costs. Therefore, managers have an incentive to reduce these 
agency costs. One method is to disclose more accounting information to satisfy the needs of debenture holders 
(Morris, 1987). In addition, by disclosing more information, highly leveraged firms can assure creditors that they are 
less likely to bypass their covenant claims (Ali et al., 2004). Similarly, Wallace et al. (1994) argue that high-
leverage firms have a greater obligation to satisfy the informational needs of their long-term creditors and, thus, may 
provide more detailed information in their annual reports than low-leverage firms. Consequently, it is hypothesized 
that 
 
H6: The level of segment disclosure is positively associated with a firm’s leverage. 
 
In their review of disclosure and determinants studies, Chavent et al. (2006) found that growing firms are 
more likely to conceal sensitive information, because full disclosure may jeopardize their competitive positions. 
Similarly, Prencipe (2004) argues that the potential competitive costs arising from disclosing segment information 
tend to be particularly high for growing firms, as competitors could use this information to the detriment of growing 
firms. Thus, a negative relationship between a firm‘s growth and level of segment disclosure is expected to be 
found. Consequently, it is hypothesized that 
 
H7: The level of segment disclosures is negatively associated with a firm’s growth. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
4.1 Population, Sample, And Data Collection 
 
Since all companies operating on the KSE must comply with IAS 14 disclosure requirements in accordance 
with Resolution No. 18 of 1990, the population of this study for measuring segment disclosure consists of all the 
companies listed on the KSE in 2008. The KSE‘s Investor Guide for 2008 shows that, by the end of 2008, the KSE 
listed 189 Kuwaiti companies. However, it should be noted that not all KSE companies are diversified and, 
therefore, some companies are not relevant to this study. Thus, the selection of companies in the sample is based on 
the applicability of segment disclosure requirements to the firm. That is, firms that can be segmented into business 
lines or geographical areas are included in the study sample. After employing this criterion to the entire population, 
the sample consists of 123 KSE-listed companies. All the financial statements for KSE-listed companies were 
obtained from the Auto Documentation and Archival Department at the KSE. Table 1 shows the industry 
classification of sample companies and their percentages relative to the entire sample population. 
 
 
Table 1: Number Of Companies At The End Of 2008 And The Sample Size 
Industry Classification 
No. of Companies at the 
End of 2008 
No. of Companies in the 
Sample 
% 
Financial 
(Banks and Insurance) 
16 15 12% 
Investment 46 39 32% 
Real Estate 36 20 16% 
Industrial 
(Industry and Food) 
34 28 23% 
Service 57 21 17% 
Total 189 123 100% 
 
 
4.2 Measuring the Extent Of Segment Disclosure  
 
The dependent variable in this study is the level of segment disclosure. A Segment Disclosure Index (SDI) 
was developed based on IAS 14 mandatory requirements. In constructing and developing the SDI, the official IASB 
volume for 2008 (IASB, 2008) is used to obtain details about IAS 14 requirements. The SDI is constructed to 
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specifically address the mandatory disclosure requirements of IAS 14. Disclosures that are explicitly voluntary or 
merely encouraged are not included in the SDI. From IAS 14, 28 mandatory disclosure requirements are obtained 
and set out in the constructed SDI (Appendix A). Following prior studies on scoring the index (Tower et al., 1999; 
Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Glaum and Street, 2003; Ali et al., 2004; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008), an item of information was assigned ―1‖ if it is clearly disclosed, ―0‖ if it is clearly not, 
and the conventional ―N/A‖ if it is clearly not applicable. 
 
4.3 Determinants Of Segment Disclosures  
 
Specific firm characteristics are used as determinants of segment disclosures in this study. Information 
regarding firm age, industry categories, and ownership diffusion were obtained from the official KSE‘s Web site. 
Data related to firm size, audit quality, profitability, leverage, and growth were extracted from the companies‘ 
financial statements. Table 2 presents definitions of all specific company characteristics used in this study as 
determinants of segment disclosures.  
 
 
Table 2: Definition Of Firm Characteristics (Independent Variables) 
Independent 
Variable Operationalization 
Company size The log of total assets  
Audit quality Dummy variable coded 1 if one Big-4 audit firm audits the company‘s financial statements and 0 otherwise 
Company age Number of years passed since incorporated 
Ownership 
diffusion Number of shares owned by outsiders / number of outstanding shares at year-end 
Profitability Return on equity (ROE) 
Leverage Total debt / total shareholders equity 
Growth The growth in sales over the previous fiscal year 
Industry Dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the financial institutions category and 0 otherwise; dummy variable 
that equals 1 for firms in the investment category and 0 otherwise; dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in 
the industrial category and 0 otherwise; dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the service category and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
4.4 Model Specification  
 
After determining the level of segment disclosures, the next step is to investigate the relationship between 
the level of segment disclosures and the firm‘s characteristics to explain why firms differ in their level of segment 
disclosures. A multiple regression model is used to determine which firm characteristics are associated with segment 
disclosures. Thus, the following regression model was fitted to the data: 
 
Y= β0 + β1 (company size) + β2 (audit quality) + β3 (company age) + β4 (ownership diffusion) +  
β5 (profitability) + β6 (leverage) + β7 (growth) + β8-11(industry1-4) + ε 
 
where, Y = segment disclosure score; β0 = regression intercept, the other 
β
 s are the parameters of the Model.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for Segment Disclosure Index (SDI). The table shows that the mean 
for the SDI of a sample of KSE-listed companies in 2008 was 0.56, with a minimum score of 0.18 and a maximum 
of 0.94. These results suggest that disclosure levels among the 123 sample companies were widely distributed. A 
notable variation in firms‘ levels of segment disclosure is observed in the study sample. This variation encourages 
an examination of the company characteristics that affect the level of segment disclosure. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics For The Segment Disclosure Index (Sdi) 
Dependent Variable N Mean Min Max Standard Deviation 
SDI 123 0.56 0.18 0.94 0.22 
 SDI = Segment Disclosure Index 
 
 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent continuous and dummy variables used in this 
study. A significant degree of variation exists in firm size as shown in Panel A. Firm size ranges from KD 5.46 
million to KD 11973.23 million, with a mean of 411.03 million and a median of 100.23 million. Due to the non-
normality, firm size was transformed using the natural logarithm of total assets as of December 31, 2008, as shown 
in the variable LSIZE. In addition, Panel A of Table 4 shows that the age of firms examined in this study ranged 
from 4 to 57 years, with a mean of 26 years and a median of 27 years. Ownership diffusion ranges from 0 to 0.96, 
with a mean of 0.55 and firm profitability varies from -0.58 to 0.48, with a mean of 0.07. In addition, the descriptive 
statistics presented in Panel A shows that firm leverage ranges from 0.01 to 0.98, with a mean of 0.43, and firm 
growth range from -0.97 to 5.17, with a mean of 0.20. Panel B of Table 4 presents the distribution of firms that were 
audited by Big-4 and non-Big-4 audit firms. The results reveal that 59% of the firms included in the study were 
audited by Big-4 audit firms, while 41% of the firms were audited by non-Big-4 audit firms. Table 5 shows 
colinearity diagnostic statistics based on the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. The VIF values presented in Table 
5 do not raise concern regarding multicolinearity among variables because all variables had low VIF values. The 
VIF value for each independent variable is way below the suggested VIF of 10 (Belsley et al., 1980; Neter et al., 
1989). Consequently, multicolinearity did not appear to be a serious problem in interpreting the regression results of 
this study. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics For Independent Continuous And Dummy Variables 
Panel A:  
Independent Variable 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SIZE 411.03 100.23 1082.70 5.46 11973.32 
LSIZE 11.55 11.51 1.48 8.61 15.66 
AGE 25.80 27.00 13.06 4.00 57.00 
OWNERSHIP 0.55 0.57 0.22 0 0.96 
PROFIT 0.07 0.08 0.11 -0.58 0.48 
LEVERAGE 0.43 0.46 0.28 0.01 0.98 
GROWTH 0.20 0.12 0.78 -0.97 5.17 
Panel B: 
Dummy Variable 
Frequency Percent 
   
Auditor Quality      
Non-Big-4 51 41    
Big-4 72 59    
Total 123 100    
SIZE is the amount of firms‘ total assets (KD million) at the end of 2008; LSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
end of 2008; AGE is the number of years passed since foundation to the end of 2008; OWNERSHIP diffusion is measured by 
number of shares owned by outsiders / number of outstanding shares at year-end; PROFIT is the Return on Equity (ROE) for the 
year ended 31 December, which is the ratio of net income to average common shareholders‘ equity; LEVERAGE is the ratio of 
total debt to total shareholders‘ equity at the end of 2008, and GROWTH is the growth in sales over the previous fiscal year. 
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Table 5: Colinearity Statistics 
Independent Variable Tolerance VIF 
LSIZE 0.471 2.124 
AGE 0.789 1.267 
OWNERSHIP 0.776 1.289 
PROFITABILITY 0.941 1.063 
LEVERAGE 0.561 1.782 
GROWTH 0.901 1.110 
 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Table 6 provides the results of the multiple regression model. The results of the multiple regression reveal 
that the regression model, which attempts to explain variation in the segment disclosure level in term of firm 
attributes, is highly significant (F = 5.237, p < 0.000). The adjusted R² of the multiple regression model indicates 
that company attributes considered in this study explain 23% of the variation in segment disclosures. Consistent with 
hypothesis 1 (H1), Table 6 shows that firm size (LSIZE) is a significant factor in explaining the variations in 
segment disclosure levels among KSE-listed firms (p < 0.01). This result supports the argument that larger firms are 
more willing to disclose information to reduce political costs and mitigate litigation and government intervention. In 
addition, the cost associated with accumulating information is lower for larger firms because of their extensive 
internal reporting systems. In comparison, smaller firms are more likely to conceal sensitive information because 
full disclosure could jeopardize their competitive positions (Chavent et al., 2006). This result confirms prior 
disclosure research that suggests a positive relationship between firm size and information disclosure (Ali et al., 
2004; Chavent et al., 2006; Gallery et al., 2008). 
 
As predicted in hypothesis 2 (H2), the results in Table 6 show that the auditor type (AUDIT) is a significant 
factor in explaining variations in the level of segment disclosures (p < 0.05). This finding suggests that KSE firms 
that are audited by a Big-4 auditing firm tend to have a higher level of segment disclosures than firms audited by a 
non-Big-4 auditing firm. This result confirms the notion of Wallace et al. (1994) that firms audited by 
internationally affiliated audit firms—the Big-4—are more likely to provide more detailed information than are 
firms audited by local audit firms. This is because the internationally affiliated audit firms are larger and backed by 
more expertise than are local audit firms (Wallace et al., 1994).  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicts that the level of segment disclosures is positively associated with firm age 
(AGE). Table 6 shows this to be the case (p < 0.01). Thus, older KSE-listed firms, because of their maturity and 
associated learning experience, are more likely to have well-established accounting procedures that produce more 
detailed information than younger KSE firms. Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Glaum and Street (2003) note that having 
well-established accounting systems can reduce costs and increase the ease of gathering, processing, and 
disseminating the information needed to comply with required disclosures. Another possible explanation for the 
significant, positive association between firm age and disclosure level is the potential competitive disadvantage to 
younger firms in disclosing more information according to their line of business or geographical area of business. 
Competitors could use this information to the detriment of younger firms. In contrast, older firms might be more 
motivated to disclose such information because doing so would be less likely to harm their competitive position 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  
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Table 6: Multivariate Regression Analysis Results 
 SDI = β0 + β1 (company size) + β2 (audit quality) + β3 (company age) + β4 (ownership diffusion) + β5 (profitability) + β6 
(leverage) + β7 (growth) + β8-11(industry1-4) + ε 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic  
Intercept  -0.205 -0.898  
LIZE + 0.048 2.605+++  
AUDIT + 0.042 2.131++ 
AGE + 0.005 2.632+++  
OWNERSHIP + 0.065 0.652  
PROFIT + 0.308 1.975++  
LEVERAGE + 0.032 2.158++  
GROWTH - 0.012 0.464  
IND_FT ? 0.211 2.324**  
IND_INVST ? 0.075 1.221  
IND_INDUS ? 0.090 1.338  
IND_SERV ? 0.087 1.374  
N R² Adj.R² F-statistic p-value (F-statistics) 
123 0.294 0.238 5.237 0.000 
++, +++ significant at the 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively (one-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
SDI is the ratio of a firm's actual segment disclosure score to the maximum segment score that the firm is expected to achieve if 
the firm fully complies with the mandatory segment disclosure requirements of the IAS 14; LSIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets at the end of 2008; AUDIT is a dummy variable coded 1 if one Big-4 audit firm audits the firm‘s financial statements 
and 0 otherwise 
; AGE is the number of years passed since foundation to the end of 2008; OWNERSHIP diffusion is measured by number of 
shares owned by outsiders / number of outstanding shares at year-end; PROFIT is the Return on Equity (ROE) for the year 
ended 31 December, which is the ratio of net income to average common shareholders‘ equity; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total 
debt to total shareholders‘ equity at the end of 2008 and GROWTH is the growth in sales over the previous fiscal year; IND_FT 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the Financial Institutions category, and 0 otherwise; IND_INVST is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for firms in the Investment category, and 0 otherwise; IND_INDUS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
firms in the Industrial category, and 0 otherwise; IND_SERV is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in the Service 
category, and 0 otherwise (the omitted industry category when all categories are 0 is the Real Estate category). 
 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 5 (H5), the results in Table 6 show that the level of segment disclosures is 
positively and significantly associated with firm profitability (PROFIT) (p < 0.01). This finding supports the 
argument that managers are more likely to disclose detailed information when profitability is high to signal their 
ability to maximize shareholders‘ value and to avoid share undervaluation. This way they increase the security of 
their positions and justify their compensation. On the other hand, firms may disclose less information when 
profitability is low to hide the various reasons for declining profitability or losses (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Inchausti, 1997). In support of hypothesis 6 (H6), Table 6 shows that the level of segment disclosure is positively 
and significantly associated with firm leverage (p < 0.05). This result is consistent with the notion that highly geared 
companies have a greater need to reduce agency costs and satisfy the information needs of long-term creditors; thus, 
they provide more detailed information in their annual reports to meet those needs than lower-geared companies 
(Morris, 1987; Wallace et al., 1994).  
 
In contrast, an insignificant positive association is observed for ownership diffusion. Thus, hypothesis 4 
(H4), that segment disclosure is positively associated with firm leverage, is not supported. Similarly, firm growth is 
found to be insignificantly associated with segment disclosure. Thus, hypothesis 7 (H7), that segment disclosure is 
negatively associated with firm growth, is not supported. Industry categories were used as control variables. For 
control variables, the results show that industry categories (except the financial sector) do not significantly influence 
segment disclosures. One possible reason could be because firms operating in the financial sector tend to have solid 
infrastructure and information systems that enable them to gather and process information easily.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The objective of the study is to evaluate the segment disclosure practice of KSE-listed firms as well as the 
factors that influence the level of segment disclosure. The existing theoretical literature on disclosure has used the 
capital need theory, agency theory, and signalling theory to provide possible motives for firms‘ financial reporting 
disclosure and to explain variations in the level of financial reporting disclosure across firms. In general, these 
studies show that firms might benefit from giving investors additional accounting information to exploit the 
disclosure benefits that exceed disclosure costs, such as lower capital or debt cost. In addition, several disclosure 
studies explore the relationship between the level of segment disclosure and several corporate characteristics, such 
as size, profitability, growth, ownership diffusion, audit quality, leverage, and age.  
 
The literature pertinent to disclosure highlights the effects of specific firm characteristics on a firm‘s 
disclosure level. To investigate the determinants of segment disclosures, this study examines seven firm attributes 
identified in previous studies as significant factors affecting disclosure levels. It is hypothesized that the level of 
segment disclosure increases with firm size, auditor type, age, ownership diffusion, profitability, and leverage. It is 
predicted that the level of segment disclosure will decrease with firm growth. Consistent with prior disclosure 
research, the level of segment disclosure is examined using a disclosure index based on the mandatory requirements 
of the IAS 14. Descriptive statistics indicate that the average level of segment disclosure in the sample of 123 KSE 
listed firm in 2008 was 56%, ranging from 18% to 94%. A notable variation in the firms‘ levels of segment 
disclosure is observed in the study sample. This variation encourages an examination of company characteristics that 
affect the level of segment disclosure. A multiple regression model is used to determine which company 
characteristics are associated with segment disclosures. The findings indicate that firm size, auditor type, age, 
profitability, and leverage are significant factors in explaining the level of segment disclosure among KSE listed 
firms. In contrast, the results show that ownership diffusion and growth are not significant factors in explaining the 
level of segment disclosure. 
 
This study contributes by providing an assessment of the level of segment disclosure among KSE-listed 
companies and the factors that influence the extent of segment disclosure. The findings of this study provide some 
feedback to the regulatory and enforcement bodies in Kuwait about the current segment disclosure practice of KSE-
listed firms and the factors that influence the level of segment disclosures. The noticeable variation in the level of 
segment disclosure across listed firms suggests a need for further monitoring of the enforcement of required segment 
disclosure. In addition, users of KSE-listed firms‘ financial statements might reasonably expect greater segment 
disclosures from larger, older, highly leveraged, and profitable KSE-listed firms, as well as from firms audited by a 
Big-4 audit firm. 
 
This study has limitations. First, the conclusions drawn are subject to an unavoidably small sample size as 
the KSE is a relatively small market. Second, the subjectivity inherent in scoring the segment disclosures is a 
concern in this and previous disclosure studies. However, consistent with previous well-known disclosure studies, 
several approaches were undertaken to minimize and overcome this potential bias and uncertainty in determining 
firm segment disclosure scores. Third, the possibility always exists that the study may have omitted other factors 
that would help explain this variation, such as corporate governance quality. Despite these limitations, this study 
contributes to the existing knowledge in the area of the segment reporting. This study has been a cross-sectional 
examination. How the current pattern of disclosure will change over time is contestable, but clearly a longitudinal 
study will be needed in due course to obtain a fuller understanding of the determinants of segment disclosure. In 
addition, it would be interesting to investigate the currently enforced IFRS 8 (Operating Segments) that replace IAS 
14 and examine whether segment disclosures have improved with the introduction of IFRS 8.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: IAS 14 Disclosure Checklist1 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements  Score* 
IAS 14  Segment Reporting   
Para. 51 1 
For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose the segment revenue from sales to 
external customers 
 
Para. 51 2 
For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose the segment revenue from transactions 
with other segments  
 
Para. 52 3 
For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose segment result from continuing 
operations separately from segment result from discontinued operations 
 
Para. 55 4 
An enterprise should disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets for each reportable 
segment 
 
Para. 56 5 An enterprise should disclose segment liabilities for each reportable segment  
Para. 57 6 
An enterprise should disclose the total cost incurred during the period to acquire segment assets 
that are expected to be used during more than one period (property, plant, equipment, and 
intangible assets) for each reportable segment  
 
Para. 58 7 
An enterprise should disclose the total amount of expense included in segment result for 
depreciation and amortisation of segment assets for the period for each reportable segment 
 
Para. 61 8 
For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose the total amount of significant non-
cash expenses (other than depreciation and amortisation) that were included in segment expense    
 
Para. 61 9 
For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose   aggregate of the entity‘s share of the 
net profit or loss of associates, joint ventures, or other investments accounted for under the equity 
method, if substantially all of those associates‘ (or joint ventures‘ or other investments‘) 
operations are within that single segment 
Para. 67 10 
An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment revenue and the enterprise‘s 
revenue from external customers  
 
Para. 67 11 
An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment result from continuing operations 
and a comparable measure of the enterprise‘s operating profit or loss from continuing operations 
 
Para. 67 12 
An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment result from discontinued 
operations and the enterprise‘s profit or loss from discontinued operations 
 
Para. 67 13 An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment assets and the enterprise‘s assets  
Para. 67 14 
An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment liabilities and the enterprise‘s 
liabilities 
 
Para. 69  
If the enterprise’s primary format for reporting segment information is business segments, the 
following information should be disclosed: 
 
Para. 69 
(a) 
15 
Disclose segment revenue from external customers, by geographical area, based on geographical 
location of its customers, for each geographical segment whose revenue from sales to external 
customers is 10 per cent or more of total enterprise revenue from sales to all external customers  
 
Para. 69 
(b) 
16 
Disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets, by geographical location of assets, for each 
geographical segment whose segment assets are 10 per cent or more of the total assets of all 
geographical segments  
 
Para. 69 
(c) 
17 
Disclose the total cost incurred during the period to acquire segment assets that are expected to be 
used during more than one period (property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets), by 
geographical location of assets, for each geographical segment whose segment assets are 10 per 
cent or more of the total assets of all geographical segments  
 
Para. 70  
If the enterprise’s primary format of reporting segment information is geographical segments, the 
enterprise should disclose the following segment information for each business segment whose 
revenue from sales to external customers is 10 per cent or more of total entity revenue from sales 
to all external customers whose segment assets are 10 per cent or more of the total assets of all 
business segments:   
 
Para. 70 
(a) 
18 Disclose segment revenue from external customers 
 
Para. 70 
(b) 
19 Disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets 
 
                                                 
1 The official IASB volume for 2008 (IASB, 2008) was used to obtain details about each IAS 14 requirement.     
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Para. 70 
(c) 
20 
Disclose the total cost incurred during the period to acquire segment assets that are expected to be 
used during more than one period (e.g. property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets) 
 
Para. 74  
If a business segment or geographical segment for which information is reported to the board of 
directors and chief executive officer is not a reportable segment because it earns a majority of its 
revenue from sales to other segments, but nonetheless its revenue from sales to external 
customers is 10 per cent or more of total entity revenue from sales to all external customers, the 
enterprise shall disclose: 
Para. 
74(a) 
21 Disclose the fact that these circumstances exist 
Para. 
74(b) 
22 Disclose the amount of revenue from sales to external customers 
Para. 
74(c) 
23 Disclose the amount of revenue from internal sales to other segments 
Para. 75 24 An enterprise should disclose the basis of pricing inter-segment transfers  
Para. 75 25 An enterprise should disclose any changes in the basis of pricing inter-segment transfers  
Para. 76 26 
An enterprise should disclose changes in accounting policies adopted for segment reporting that 
have a material effect on segment information  
 
Para. 76 27 An enterprise should disclose a description of the nature of the change in accounting policies  
Para. 76 28 An enterprise should disclose the reasons for the change in accounting policies  
Para. 76 29 
An enterprise should disclose the fact that comparative information has been restated to account 
for the change in accounting policies or that it is impracticable to do so  
 
Para. 81 30 
An enterprise should disclose the types of products and service included in each reported business 
segment 
 
Para. 81 31 An enterprise should disclose the composition of each reported geographical segment  
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 14 Requirements 
 
 
* Scoring Procedure:  
 1 = Requirement is complied with 
 0 = Requirement is not complied with 
N/A = Requirement is not applicable 
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